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WARNING TO BUYER- NEVER PAY TOO MUCH TO 
ELECT A JUDGE (CAPERTONv. A.T MASSEYCOAL 
COMPANY, INC., ET AL.) 
by 
J.L. Yranski Nasuti, J.D., LL.M.* 
In John Grisham's novel, The Appeal, a Mississippi jury 
awarded a $41 million dollar verdict against a chemical 
company that was found to have dumped toxic waste into a 
town's water supply. The company's C.E.O. responded to the 
verdict by instructing his attorneys to initiate an aggressive 
appeal and by covertly contributing over $8 million to an effort to 
unseat a state supreme court justice who would most likely 
rule in favor of the plaintiff. The main qualification of the 
opposing candidate was his ability to be manipulated, 
marketed, and elected primarily for the purpose of eventually 
ruling in favor of the chemical company. The story is a good 
read- with a somewhat unexpected ending. It is also based, in 
part, on a real case that began in West Virginia and found its 
way to the U.S. Supreme Court) In that case, a $50 million 
jury award against the mining companies, was vacated by the 
West Virginia State Supreme Court in a 3-to-2 decision (with 
the deciding vote being cast by a justice who had received 
substantial campaign contributions from a powerful local 
bus inessman who also happened to be the chairman of the 
board and C.E.O. of the defendant mining companies). By the 
time the case of Caperton et at. v. A. T Massey Coal Company, 
*Professor of Legal Studies in Business, Iona College, New 
Rochelle, NY 
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Inc., et a/. 2 reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the sole issue to 
be addressed was whether the plaintiffs' due process rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated when the 
justice who had received the extraordinary campaign 
contributions refused to recuse himself from the case. 
I. 
The original dispute between Hugh Caperton and A. T. 
Massey Coal Company, Inc. is, from a literary point of view, 
far less dramatic than the one presented in The Appeal. A. T. 
Massey Coal Company, Inc. is one of the largest coal mining 
companies in the United States. During the 1990s, LTV Steel 
rejected Massey's repeated offers to sell it coal. LTV, instead, 
continued to use the services of an intermediary, Wellmore 
Corporation, to purchase a higher quality metallurgical coal 
that was produced by Harman Mine. Harmon Mine was a 
smaller Virginia company, which had been purchased, in 1993, 
by Harman Development Corporation, a company formed by 
Hugh Caperton. 3 In 1997, Massey bought the parent company 
of Wellmore- with the sole intention of finally selling its coal 
to LTV through Wellmore. Massey's plans were frustrated 
when LTV not only continued to reject offers to purchase 
Massey's coal but also terminated its relationship with 
Wellmore. Massey responded by directing Wellmore to invoke a 
force majeure clause, in the long-term contract that Wellmore had 
with Harman Mine, in order to substantially reduce the 
amount of coal that Wellmore would have to purchase from 
Harman Mine. 4 The drastic reduction in the order was a 
serious financial blow to Harman Mine since it occurred too 
late in the year for company to find another buyer for its coal. 
To make matters worse, Massey, which had been negotiating a 
deal to purchase Harman Mine from Caperton, backed away 
from those negotiations in a manner that increased the financial 
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distress of the Harman companies 5 and also utilized the 
confidential information obtained in the course of the process 
to make the Hannan Mine unattractive to others and to 
decrease its value. Hugh Caperton and the Harman companies 
eventually had no choice but to file for Chapter 11 protection 
in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Virginia.6 
In May 1998, Harman Mining, Inc. and Sovereign Coal 
Sales, Inc . (two of the companies that originally owned 
Harman Mines when it entered into the long-term sales 
agreement with Wellmore) brought an action against Wellmore in 
the Virginia state court alleging breach of contract and 
breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 7 A jury 
found in favor of the plaintiffs on their breach of contract claim 
and awarded $6 million in damage. 
In the fall of 1998, Hugh Caperton and the Harman 
Companies (hereinafter referred to as Caperton) filed a lawsuit, 
this time in a West Virginia state court, against A.T. Massey 
Coal Company, Inc. and five of its subsidiaries (Elk Run Coal 
Company, Inc. , Independence Coal Company, Inc., Marfork 
Coal Company, Inc. , Perfoi _ ance Coal Company, and Massey 
Coal Sales Company) (hereinafter referred to collectively as 
"Massey").8 In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged 
claims of tortuous interference with existing contractual 
relations, tortuous interference with prospective contractual 
relations , fraudulent misrepresentations, civil conspiracy, 
negligent misrepresentation, and punitive damages. During the 
pretrial stage of the West Virginia case, the defendants filed an 
unsuccessful motion to dismiss based on a claim that the longterm 
coal supply contract, which was at the heart of the case, contained 
a forum selection clause that required the case to be heard in 
Buchanan County, Virginia. The defendants also filed an 
unsuccessful motion for summary judgment based on the 
claim that the action was barred under the legal principal of res 
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judicata. In 2002, a jury returned a $50 million verdict in favor of 
the plaintiffs. The defendants immediately filed a motion seeking 
judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or, in the alternative, 
remittitur. Two and a half years later, the motion was denied 
by the Circuit Court9 and the defendants appealed the decision 
to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals . It was at this 
point that the legal issues in the case began to turn from those 
primarily relating to a breached contract to something 
completely different. 
After the jury verdict was delivered but before the filing of an 
appeal in the West Virginia Supreme Court , Don 
Blankenship, chairman, chief executive officer, and president 
of the Massey Energy Company, took a very personal, and not 
inexpensive, interest in the composition of the state appellate 
court that would decide the outcome of the Massey case. The 
voters in 39 states elect some, if not all, of their state court 
judges.1h West Virginia is one of the few states were all 
judicial positions are filled through partisan elections. In 
2004, Justice Warren McGraw, a Democrat, was seeking 
reelection to the West Virginia Supreme Court. His opponent, 
Brent Benjamin, was a Republican with no prior judicial 
experience. Benjamin, however, had something much more 
valuable than experience. He had a wealthy supporter, Don 
Blankenship. Blankenship had contributed to judicial 
campaigns in the past- but always in amounts not exceeding a 
few thousand dollars. His donations to unseat McGraw and 
elect Benjamin exceeded $3 million. Blankenship contributed 
$1 ,000 (the statutory maximum) to Benjamin's campaign 
committee; $2.5 million to "And for the Sake of The Kids," a 
political organization, which was established under 26 U.S.C. § 
527 and which supported Benjamin; and over $500,000 on 
independent expenditures such as direct mailings, solicitation 
letters, and media advertisements "to support ... Brent 
Benjamin.' 1 Blankenship's total contributions exceeded the 
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amount spent by Benjamin's other supporters and was treble 
the amount spent by Benjamin's own committee. He also 
donated $1 million more than the combined amounts spent by the 
campaign committees for Benjamin and McGraw. 12 The outcome 
of the election was a win for Benjamin who received 53.3% of 
the votes cast. 
In the fall of 2005, Caperton filed a motion to disqualify 
Justice Benjamin from participating in any future appeal 
involving the trial court's decision against Massey. Caperton 
argued that under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct, 
Justice Benjamin had to recuse himself based on the conflict 
resulting from the campaign contributions that he had received 
from Blankenship. Under West Virginia law, the only party 
who can rule on such a motion is the judge to whom the 
disqualification request is directed. Benjamin denied the 
motion noting that he could find "no objective information ... 
to show that this Justice has a bias for or against any litigant, 
that this Justice has prejudiced the matters which comprise this 
litigation, or that this Justice will be anything but fair and 
impartial." 13 When the West Virginia Supreme Court 
subsequently granted Massey's petition for appeal , it did so 
with the participation of Benjamin. 
In 2007, West Virginia Supreme Court reversed the $50 
million verdict against Massey on two grounds. The first was 
that the forum-selection clause in the contract (to which 
Massey was not a party) barred suit in West Virginia. The 
second was that the principle of res judicata barred the West 
Virginia suit since there had already been an out-of-state 
judgment (to which Massey had not been a party.) The 3-to-2 
decision was supported by then-Chef Justice Davis and Justices 
Benjamin and Maynard and opposed by Justices Starcher and 
Albright. 
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Caperton successfully moved for a rehearing of the case. 
This time both sides filed motions to disqualify three of the 
five justices who had been involved in the original appeal. 
Massey challenged the impartiality of Justice Starcher based on 
critical comments that he had made about Blankenship's 
involvement in the 2004 elections.' 4 Caperton, in turn , 
requested the recusal of Justice Maynard after photos surfaced of 
him vacationing with Blankenship on the French Riviera at the 
same time that the appeal was pending. Both Starcher and 
Maynard agreed to disqualify themselves from participating in the 
rehearing. Justice Benjamin, on the other hand, once again 
denied Caperton's recusal motion which was based on the 
same grounds raised in the 2005 motion. 15 By the time the 
case was set for its rehearing, Benjamin was the acting chief 
justice. That gave him the responsibility of selecting Judges 
Cookman and Fox to replace the recused justices. It also 
precipitated Caperton's third unsuccessful recusal request of 
Benjamin. 
The outcome of the second hearing was the same as the 
first. In a 3-to-2 decision, the West Virginia Supreme Court 
once again reversed the jury verdict. This time Justices Davis, 
writing a modified version of his prior majority decision, was 
joined by acting-Chief Justice Benjamin and Judge Fox. Judge 
Cookman joined Justice Albright in a dissenting opinion that 
concluded that the majority's opinion was fundamentally unfair 
and that the acting-chief justice's refusal to recuse himself had 
genuine due process implications . Caperton filed a writ of 
certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. One month later 
Benjamin issued his concurring opinion that addressed both the 
merits of the majority decision as well as the minority's 
criticism of his own decision not to recuse himself. 16 
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II. 
The sole issue presented to the U.S. Supreme Court, in the 
case of Caperton, et al. v. A. T. Massey, et al., 17 was whether a 
plaintiffs due process guarantees were violated when a justice, 
who had received extraordinary campaign contributions from 
and through the efforts of the chairman of the board and C.E.O. 
of the defendant, denied the plaintiffs recusal motion. In a 5-
to-4 decision, which was delivered by Justice Anthony 
Kennedy and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David 
Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, the Court 
reversed the decision of the West Virginia Supreme Court and 
remanded the case for further proceedings. Two dissenting 
opinions were filed in the case. The first was written by Chief 
Justice John Roberts and joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, 
Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito. The second was a short 
solo dissent by Justice Scalia. 
A. Majority Opinion 
The majority opinion began with a brief review of the 
different approaches taken by the common law, legislation and 
judicial codes, and case law with regard to the issue of judicial 
recusals. Under the common law, judges were expected to 
recuse themselves where they have a direct substantial 
pecuniary interest in a case.18 The rationale for such a rule was 
explained by James Madison in The Federalist Papers when he 
wrote "[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; 
because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and not 
improbably, corrupt his integrity." 19 Legislation and judicial 
codes were later enacted to supplement the common law rules--
especially in those instances where a judge demonstrated 
personal bias and prejudice absent a direct substantial 
pecuniary interest in a case. Finally, case law identified a 
variety of situations where, as an objective matter, the 
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probability of the judge's actual bias was too high to be 
constitutionally tolerable. Of particular interest to the majority, 
were its own precedents in two kinds due process cases. The 
first involved judges who had the kind of personal and direct 
financial interests in the outcome of a case which were not 
covered by the common law rule and the second concerned 
judges who had charged defendants with criminal contempt 
and then refused to recuse themselves from presiding over the 
subsequent contempt proceedings. 
The majority identified three cases, Tumey v. Ohio, 20 Ward 
v. Monroeville, 2I and Aetna Life Insurance Co. v Lavoie et 
al.,22 in which the U.S. Supreme Court had addressed the issue of 
whether a judge should be disqualified from hearing a case if 
the judge had a personal and financial interest that would not 
necessitate recusal under the common law. In each instance, 
the Court concluded that due process violations occurred when 
the judges refused to recuse themselves. 
In Tumey, the mayor of a small town also served as the 
judge in limited local criminal proceedings involving an Ohio 
prohibition law. Under the terms of the statute, the mayor was 
only compensated for his judicial work if he found the 
defendant to be guilty. The municipality was also entitled to a 
percentage of the fines that the mayor assessed against the 
guilty defendants. 23 The unanimous decision, delivered by 
Chief Justice William Taft, clearly stated that while every 
question of judicial qualification may not raise a constitutional 
issue (especially matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, 
and remoteness of intere st which are generally left to 
legislative discretion)/ 4 "it certainly violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due 
process of law, to subject his liberty or property to the 
judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, 
substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against 
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him in his case. "25 The Court concluded that in this instance 
the mayor, acting as judge, had both a direct pecuniary interest in 
the outcome (in so far as a guilty verdict increased his 
personal income) as well as an official motive (in so far as that 
same finding would augment his village's revenues). 
The mayor in the Monroeville case also sa t as a judge on 
cases involving ordinance violations and traffic offenses. 
Although the mayor received no additional compensation for 
his judicial work, his village received a major portion of its 
revenue from the fines, forfeitures, costs, and fees that were 
generated by the mayor's court. As in the Tumey case, the 
primary issue was "whether the mayor's situation [was] one 
"which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a 
judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the 
defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance 
nice, clear and true between the State and the accused. ""26 
Justice William Brennan, in a 7-2 decision, concluded that a 
due process violation had occurred since the mayor's executive 
responsibilities for the village's finances exposed him to the 
"possible temptation" of rendering partisan decisions in order 
to fill the village coffers. 
The recusal motion in the Lavoie case was primarily 
directed at a member of the Alabama Supreme Court who 
refused to disqualify himself from case involving an insurance 
company's bad-faith failure to pay a claim. Although the 
justice was not a party in that particular action, he was the lead 
plaintiff in a pending class action suit with a nearly identical 
claim against a different insurance company. The plaintiffs in 
that action included all state workers (including other members of 
the Alabama court) who were insured under the state's 
group medical plan. Both cases were based on an area of law 
that, at the time, was unsettled in the state. When the 
challenged justice cast the tie breaking vote in favor of Lavoie 
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in the state supreme court, he guaranteed that there would be a 
precedent for recognizing bad-faith failure claims and 
awarding punitive awards in his own pending action. Even 
though Chief Justice Warren Burger, writing for the majority, 
found the justice's interest in the Lavoie appeal to be "direct, 
personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary, "27 he saw no need to 
decide whether the justice had in fact been influenced by his 
own interests in deciding as he did. The only necessary inquiry 
was "whether sitting on the case then before the Supreme Court 
of Alabama "would offer a possible temptation to the average ... 
judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and 
true.""28 That being the case, the Court held that it was a 
violation of due process for that one justice to participate in the 
appeal.29 
The majority then analyzed two additional U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions that dealt with another type of recusal problem 
that could not be resolved by applying common law norms. 
The defendants in In Re Murchison et a!. 30 and Mayberry v. 
Pennsylvania31 had argued for the reversal of criminal 
contempt convictions entered by judges who had participated 
in the defendants' preceding criminal proceedings. In each 
case, the Court concluded that the due process guarantees had 
been violated. 
At the time of the Murchison case, judges in Michigan state 
courts of record had the authority to conduct a "one-man grand 
jury." Judges could compel witnesses to appear before them in 
secret hearings for the purpose of testifying about suspected 
crimes. Any witness held in contempt during one of these 
proceedings was entitled to an impartial public contempt 
hearing. In Murchison, the only issue that the Court considered 
was whether it was possible for a witness to receive an 
impartial hearing if the judge who issued the original contempt 
charge during the "one-man grand jury" proceeding was the 
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same judge who would preside over the contempt hearing. 
Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority, ruled that a fair 
trial "requires not only the absence of actual bias" but also the 
prevention of "even the probability of unfairness. To this end 
no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to 
try cases where he has an interest in the outcome. "32 Black went 
on to acknowledge that such an interest could not be 
defined with precision and that it rested instead on an 
examination of the circumstances and relationships. In this 
particular case, "[h]aving been part of [the one-man grand jury] 
process a judge cannot be, in the very nature of things, wholly 
disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those accused."33 
That was because, "as a practical matter it is difficult if not 
impossible for a judge to free himself from the influence of 
what took place in his 'grand-jury' secret session. "34 
The Mayberry case involved three criminal defendants who 
chose to represent themselves in court. During the course of 
the jury trial, the defendants subjected the judge to repeated 
verbal abuse- much of a personal nature. It was, however, not 
until after the jury had returned a guilty verdict and just before 
the judge imposed his judgment on that verdict that the judge 
also pronounced one of the defendants guilty of numerous 
counts of criminal contempt which would result in significant 
jail time. The defendant argued on appeal that the trial judge's 
finding of criminal contempt was a violation of due process. 
Justice William 0. Douglas, who delivered the decision of the 
Court, agreed. While acknowledging that the actions by the 
defendant constituted "brazen efforts to denounce, insult, and 
slander the court and to paralyze the trial, " 3' the majority 
questioned the trial judge's failure, during the course of the 
trial, to maintain order in the courtroom by acting instantly, 
with propriety, holding the defendant in contempt, or excluding 
him from the courtroom, or, in some other way, insulating his 
vulgarity.36 Vicious attacks should not, by themselves, drive a 
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judge from proceeding with a case. "Where, however, [the 
judge] does not act the instant the contempt is committed, but 
waits until the end of the trial, on balance, it is generally wise 
where the marks of the unseemly conduct have left personal 
stings to ask a fellow judge to take his place."37 
Since there were no due process precedents that specifically 
addressed the issue of whether elected judges must recuse 
themselves from cases involving campaign supporters, the 
majority relied for guidance on the principles established in 
Tuniey, Monroeville, Lavoie, Murchison, and Mayberry. In 
those cases, a finding of actual bias was not required to 
establish a due process violation. As a consequence, there was no 
need to question Justice Benjamin's own subjective findings of 
impartiality and propriety or to pursue an independent 
inquiry into the matter. The majority chose instead to adapt 
Benjamin Cardozo's premise that it is not easy for a judge to 
describe the actual process by which he or she arrives at a 
judicial decision38 and observed that it is similarly difficult for 
a judge to conclude through, self-examination alone, that actual 
bias had not contributed to that judicial decision. It was for 
these reasons that there needed to be objective rules to 
guarantee "adequate protection against a judge who simply 
misreads or misapprehends the real motives at work in 
deciding [a] case."39 
There was no suggestion in the Caperton that every elected 
judge is at risk of probable bias just because he or she has 
received campaign contributions either from a party to a 
lawsuit or that party's attorney. Nonetheless, in "exceptional" 
cases, "there is a serious risk of harm- based on objective and 
reasonable perceptions-when a person with a personal sake in a 
particular case had a significant and disproportionate 
influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or 
directing the judge's election campaign when the case was 
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pending or imminent." 40 After considering a number of 
factors: the relative size of Blankenship's contributions to the 
campaign in comparison to the combined contributions of other 
donors; the total amount spent on the election; and the apparent 
impact of those contributions to the outcome of the election, 
the majority concluded that "Blankenship's campaign efforts 
had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing 
Justice Benjamin on the case.""' 
Massey and Benjamin argued that the people of West 
Virginia that had elected Benjamin to the bench based on 
factors that were independent of Blankenship's influence. 
Every major newspaper, but one, had endorsed Benjamin and 
his opponent had seemingly sabotaged himself in a much 
publicized and ill-fated campaign speech. The Court's 
response was to point out that while these kinds of arguments 
might help to answer the subjective question of the impact of 
Blankenship's campaign contributions on the Benjamin's 
victory, they did not contribute to the objective due process 
inquiry of "whether the contributor's influence on the election 
under all the circumstances "would offer a possible temptation 
to the average ... judge to ... lead him not to hold the balance 
nice, clear and true. ""42 On the other hand, a consideration 
of the comparative largess of Massey's contributions and "the 
temporal relationship between the campaign contributions, the 
justice's election, and the pendency of the case" 43 were much 
more critical to the objective inquiry. 
Blankenship made his "extraordinary" $3 million 
contribution to Benjamin's campaign during the same period of 
time that his company was preparing to file a challenge to the jury 
award in the West Virginia Supreme Court. Blankenship knew 
that it was reasonably foreseeable that the winner of the judicial 
race would participate in the outcome of that case. Under the 
circumstances, it was clear that Blankenship had a 
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vested interest in the outcome of the election. Expanding on 
the common law rule that no man should be a judge in his own 
case because of fears of bias, the Court concluded that similar 
fears can occur "when--without the consent of the other 
parties- a man chooses the judge in his own case. "44 It then 
applied the expanded principle to the judicial election process and 
held that "there was a serious, objective risk of actual bias that 
required Justice Benjamin's recusal. "45 
The majority never suggested that Justice Benjamin had 
exhibited any actual bias in favor of Massey. A finding of 
actual bias was, in fact, irrelevant since due process "may 
sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who 
would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally 
between contending parties. "46 On the other hand, the Court 
had to objectively review the facts (Blankenship's significant 
and disproportionate contributions to Justice Benjamin's 
campaign and the temporal framework of the election and the 
pending case) to determine whether they seemed to "offer a 
possible temptation to the average ... judge to ... lead him not 
to hold the balance nice, clear and true ."' The majority 
concluded that in light of the "extreme facts" of this case, 
Justice Benjamin's refusal to recuse himself suggested "the 
probability of actual bias that rises to an unconstitutional 
level."48 
Massey (and Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia in their 
minority decisions) had predicted that the recognition of a due 
process violation in this case would result in a flood of 
Caperton recusal motions and an unnecessary interference in 
state judicial elections. The majority refuted this claim by once 
again emphasizing that Caperton addressed "an extraordinary 
situation" involving facts that were "extreme by any 
measure."49 As in the earlier recusal cases cited by the Court, it 
was the extreme nature of the facts that "created an 
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unconscionable probability of bias that "cannot be defined with 
precision""'0 --and that cannot be allowed to interfere with a 
person's basic right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal. Since those 
cases had not generated a flood of Monroeville or Murchison 
motions , the Court hoped for a similar result with regard to 
future Caperton motions. 
The opinion concluded by reiterating the Court's belief that 
"the Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of 
judicial disqualifications. Congress and the states, of course, 
remain free to impose more rigorous standards for judicial 
disqualification than those we find mandated here today. "51 
Since states have implemented codes of judicial conduct that 
provide greater protection than the due process clause requires, 
most recusal cases would not involve a Constitutional issue. 
B. Minority Opinions 
1. Dissenting Opinion (Roberts) 
Chief Justice Roberts disagreed with the majority's 
extended application of the due process clause to recusal cases 
other than those in which the judge had a particular financial 
interest in the outcome of a case or those in which the judge 
presiding at the contempt hearing was the same judge who had 
issued the contempt charge in a prior proceeding. I-fis 
primary objections to the majority opinion were the difficulties 
that judges would have in applying the "probability of bias" 
standard, the amount of groundless litigation that would be 
generated by the holding, and his belief that the application of 
such a standard would contribute to the erosion of public 
confidence in judicial impartiality. 
His first objection to the majority's "objective" standard 
was that it "fails to provide clear, workable guidance for future 
cases. "52 Roberts included a list of 40 questions to demonstrate 
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how difficult it will be for judges to apply the new "probability of 
bias" standard.53 The questions raised a variety of issues 
including: how much money was too much money, 54 whether it 
mattered that the litigant had contributed to other candidates or 
made large expenditures in connection with other 
elections, 55 whether the "objective" test was determined 
through the lens of a reasonable person, a reasonable lawyer, or a 
reasonable judge,'6 and what kinds of cases were implicated by 
the doctrine-cases pending at the time of the election, 
cases reasonably likely to be brought, or important but 
unanticipated cases that were filed shortly after the election.57 In 
trying to decide why a candidate won an election, whether the 
financial support was disproportionate, and whether a likely debt 
of gratitude existed, judges would be asked to 
"simultaneously act as political scientists ... , economists ... , 
and psychologists."58 
Roberts then went on to scoff at the Court's repeated 
declaration that its new rule only applied to the "extreme," 
"exceptional," and "extraordinary" case and, therefore, would 
not generate a rash of Caperton motions. The fact that most 
cases would have little chance of success did not mean that 
they would not be filed. The proliferation of the Caperton 
motions, with claims of judicial bias or the probable bias, 
would, instead, further contribute to "bringing the judge and 
the judicial system into disrepute. "59 
The dissenting opinion concluded by questioning whether 
the facts in the case really were so extreme as to justify a 
finding of probable bias. The total amount of direct 
contributions to Justice Benjamin's campaign from 
Blankenship had been a mere $1,000 (the statutory limit). The 
rest of the $3 million were not even contributions but 
"independent expenditures" over which Benjamin had no 
control.60 The fact that "And for the Sake of the Kids,'' a 
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independent group, received two-thirds of its funding from 
Blankenship and spent over $3,623,500 to support Benjamin's 
campaign was also seen as nothing more than business as 
usual. "Consumers for Justice," an independent group 
receiving large independent expenditure from the plaintiffs' 
bar, had also spent approximately $2 million on behalf of 
Benjamin's opponent. The fact that Blankenship had 
previously contributed large amounts of money on behalf other 
West Virginia candidates reassured the minority. That seemed to 
imply that Blankenship was not spending his money just to 
influence the outcome of a particular pending case-he was 
instead seeking to change everything. 6 ' Roberts further 
suggested that after evaluating the performance of the 
candidates and checking out the newspaper endorsements, it 
was just possible that Benjamin won, not because Blankenship 
had "cho[sen] him to be the judge in his own cause" but 
because the voters thought he would be a better judge. 62 
2. Dissenting Opinion (Scalia) 
Justice Scalia, who had himself been the object of a very 
public recusal motion, 63 delivered a brief dissenting opinion. 
He began by criticizing the majority's opinion for "creat[ing] a 
vast uncertainty with respect to a point of law that can be raised 
in all litigated cases in (at least) those 39 states that elect their 
JUdges. 64 ._. d · · 1 1 · · h h 1 ' He 10un 1t partlcu ar y tromc t at t e new ru e, 
which was meant to preserve the public's confidence in the 
judicial system, would have the opposite effect. Scalia 
expressed a concern for the "eroding public confidence in the 
Nation's judicial system" and placed the blame squarely on the 
shoulders of lawyers who make litigation look like a game 
"that the party with the most resourceful lawyer can play . .. to 
win." 6' "Adding [the Caperton] claim to the vast arsenal of 
lawyerly gambits"66 would only reinforce that perception. 
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The remarkable accomplishment of the Caperton decision is 
that the Court, for the first time, turned to the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to monitor the use of 
money in a state judicial election. It certainly did not outlaw 
the use of money. (That would have been too much for Justice 
Kennedy, who less than one year later, would also write the 
majority decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission. 67) It did, however, hold that an elected judge was 
disqualified from participating in any case where an interested 
party's contribution to the judge's election efforts was large 
enough to create "the probability of actual bias." A due 
process review does not require a determination of actual bias 
on the part of the judge or a finding that the interested party's 
campaign contribution was a necessary and sufficient cause of the 
judge's victory. The only thing that matters is whether the 
interested party's spending had a "disproportionate influence" 
on a pending or imminent case. 
Both the majority and minority opmwns worry that the 
public's confidence in the judicial system is eroding. The 
majority places some of the blame for that on the public's 
perception that the right to a fair trial is jeopardized when 
elected judges are influenced by campaign contributors. 68 The 
Court's solution is to disqualify elected judges from hearing 
cases where the campaign contributions of a party to a lawsuit are 
large enough to suggest "the probability of actual bias." The 
minority judges, on the other hand, see the cause of the problem 
to be with the attorneys and not with the judges. As 
Justice Scalia wrote, the public has no confidence in a system 
that looks more that a game with victory going to the side that 
employs the most tricks. To create a new due process grounds 
for disqualifying judges (who have not even been accused with 
actual bias) is to hand the trial lawyers yet another tool in their 
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arsenal of tricks. The fear of the minority is that misuse of the 
new Caperton motion will bring judges and the judicial system 
into further disrepute. 
How unfortunate that the one issue (the elephant in the 
room) that was not addressed by any of the justices was the 
overall impact of the massive amounts of money that are now 
being spent to elect judges.69 One can only wonder how retired 
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the only living U.S. Supreme 
Court justice who has also served as an elected state court 
judge and who is a strong advocate of ending judicial elections, 
would have ruled in this case. 
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plot line involving the stacking of an appellant court was plausible. Grisham's 
response was that lilt's already happened. It happened a few years ago in 
West Virginia. A guy who owned a coal company got tired of getting sued. He 
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